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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: BEST
MEMORIALS, NEW ENGLAND REGION, 1977
PHILIP C. JESSUP MOOT COURT
COMPETITION*
The ostensibly incongruous goals of promoting peaceful nuclear
technology while simultaneously curtailing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons has resulted in often insurmountable interna-
tional tensions surrounding the transfer of nuclear technology.
The 1977 Jessup Problem poses just such a situation, in which
two fictitious countries engaged in nuclear cooperation have
reached an impasse as to their respective rights and obligations
regarding the expansion of an incipient nuclear industry. The
following memorials explore the confliciting intepretations ac-
corded international agreements as they exist between a nuclear
weapon State and a non-nuclear power.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1963, the United Republic of Pandora, one of the world's
leading nuclear powers, and the Kingdom of Shangri-La, a small
country between India and China, entered into a bilateral cooper-
ation agreement in which Pandora agreed to assist Shangri-La in
the development of a peaceful nuclear energy industry. In ex-
change, Shangri-La agreed to safeguards, designed to ensure
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on all materials and
equipment transferred from Pandora to Shangri-La. In 1964, con-
tracts were executed between Shangri-La and private Pandorian
corporations for the transfer to Shangri-La of two power reactors.
In addition, Pandorian corporations agreed to long-term fixed-
commitment fuel supply contracts. In 1968, a trilateral agree-
ment between Pandora, Shangri-La, and the International At-
omic Energy Agency [hereinafter referred to as IAEA] was exe-
cuted in which Pandora's right to ensure effective safeguards on
material shipped to Shangri-La was transferred to the IAEA.
Both Pandora and Shangri-La are members of the IAEA.
Pandora became a party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons [hereinafter referred to as NPT] on March
5, 1970. In January 1971, Pandora informed Shangri-La by means
of a diplomatic note that "Peaceful Nuclear Explosions"
* These briefs were submitted to the Jessup Competition by the Brooklyn Law
School participants and were awarded the New England Regional Prize for Best Memori-
als. The introductory sections have been modified and combined; the arguments have
been reproduced in their entirety with minor editorial changes.
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[hereinafter referred to as PNE's] are inconsistent with Pan-
dora's interpretation of Shangri-La's obligations under the Bilat-
eral Agreement and that as a signatory to the NPT, Pandora
would be required to reject any contrary interpretation. Shangri-
La never formally refuted Pandora's interpretation of the Bilat-
eral Agreement. Upon China's nuclear test in 1974, Shangri-La's
Prime Minister stated that Shangri-La would not preclude any
of its nuclear options.
Shangri-La informed Pandora in 1971 that it had decided to
construct a small, wholly indigenous reprocessing plant. In re-
sponse, Pandora argued that construction of the reprocessing
plant could not be justified economically, and that the plant
would create great proliferation dangers. In July 1976, Shangri-
La completed construction of the reprocessing plant and re-
quested permission to reprocess Pandorian-origin fuel under
IAEA safeguards.
On August 20, 1976, the President of Pandora stated in re-
sponse to a question at a televised press conference that "[wie
have no doubts about the integrity of the Kingdom of Shangri-
La. Shangri-La has committed itself to apply safeguards to the
reprocessing plant, and we have determined that they can be
effectively applied. We have no other legal option, therefore, but
to approve reprocessing of fuel suppled by the United Republic
of Pandora."
On September 20, 1976, Pandora informed Shangri-La, by
means of a diplomatic note, that it would not approve use of
Shangri-La's reprocessing plant for the reprocessing of
Pandorian-origin fuel. Pandora also stated that all fuel shipments
to Shangri-La would be terminated unless Shangri-La accepted
IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities and agreed to accept
the interpretation of the obligations between the parties in Pan-
dora's 1971 diplomatic note. Shangri-La rejected all of Pandora's
conditions and fuel shipments were terminated.
The parties submitted the dispute to the International Court
of Justice in an effort to establish a basis for continued nuclear
cooperation.
MEMORIAL FOR SHANGRI-LA: ARGUMENT
I. PANDORA HAS NO RIGHT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE BILATERAL
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AGREEMENT TO PREVENT SHANGRI-LA FROM REPROCESSING
PANDORIAN-ORIGIN FUEL.
A. Pandora must approve reprocessing in Shangri-La if it deter-
mines in good faith that the safeguard provisions in Article
XI(B)(2) can be effectively applied.
Pandora cannot arbitrarily deny Shangri-La the right to
reprocess Pandorian-origin fuel because Article VIII(F) of the
Bilateral Agreement requires Pandora to find reprocessing
"acceptable" if it determines that the safeguard provisions of
Article XI(B)(2) can be effectively applied. This is the only con-
clusion that follows logically from the use of the treaty interpreta-
tion provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties'
[hereinafter referred to as Vienna Convention], which is a reflec-
tion of customary international law.
2
Article VIII(F) of the Bilateral Agreement states that
"reprocessing of alteration shall be performed in facilities accept-
able to both parties upon a joint determination that the provi-
sions of Article XI may be effectively applied." The "ordinary
meaning' 3 of these words is that acceptability is contingent solely
upon the effective application of safeguards listed in Article XI.
Article XI(A) defines the spirit in which the safeguards are
to be administered. The exact nature of the safeguards which
must be applied are indicated in Article XI(B) (2). Application of
the legal principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius4 requires
that the safeguard provisions listed in Article XI(B) (2) be deemed
exclusive. The listing of specific rights in this article excludes, by
implication, those not listed. Since the parties obviously made a
substantial effort to list the specific safeguard rights of the parties
in Article XI(B)(2), it is logical to assume that they listed all the
safeguards they thought were necessary.
This interpretation is supported by the interplay of Article
VIII(F) and Article XI, which indicates that the construction of
1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. See also S. Ro-
SENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: GUIDE TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF VIENNA CONVENTION (1970).
2. Stipulation of Record, Correction No. 13 (Letter of Dec. 3, 1976). See Report of
the International Law Commission on its Eighteenth Session, 21 U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.
1, at 52 (1966); Advisory Opinion on the Employment of Women During the Night, [19321
P.C.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 50, at 365, 380.
3. Vienna Convention, art. 31(1).
4. See generally A. McNAMR, THE LAW OF TREATIES (1961).
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a reprocessing- plant in Shangri-La is the type of activity the
parties contemplated when they entered into the Bilateral
Agreement. Article XI concerns only the safeguard rights of
Pandora as to nuclear facilities in Shangri-La. Article VIII(F)
states that for reprocessing to be "acceptable" the provisions of
Article XI must be effectively applied. Therefore, the parties
must have agreed that, at some point, there would be a reproces-
sing plant in Shangri-La. Otherwise the reference to Article XI
in Article VIII(F) would be superfluous.
This interpretation is supported by the "object and purpose"
of the agreement and the "context" of the clauses in question.5
Article II of the Bilateral Agreement states, "the Parties shall
cooperate with each other in the achievement of the uses of at-
omic energy for peaceful purposes." Article XI states that the
parties have a common interest in assuring that nuclear material
is used only for "civil purposes." These clauses, taken together,
indicate that this treaty has two purposes: nuclear cooperation for
peaceful purposes, and the prevention of the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Both of these purposes are promoted by provid-
ing for reprocessing while providing for safeguards. The parties
would not have planned the construction of a facility that did not
promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the definition
of safeguards in Article 1(9) of the Bilateral Agreement indicates
that the purpose of safeguards is to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
The ordinary meaning of the Bilateral Agreement is not am-
biguous or obscure, nor does it lead to a result which is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable. Consequently, no reason exists for the
Court to refer to any of the contextual means of interpretation in
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, except perhaps to confirm
the interpretation of the treaty urged by Shangri-La. However,
even if the Court were, for any reason, to refer to contextual
materials, it would find that the interpretation of the treaty urged
by Shangri-La is the meaning the parties intended. Such a con-
textual approach to treaty interpretation does not mean that the
text of the treaty should be ignored. Rather, the contextual mate-
rial should be used to make the text clear.'
Shangri-La is aware that it is argued by some that small
reprocessing plants must have a military purpose because they
5. Vienna Convention, art. 31(1).
6. See note 2 supra.
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are not commercially justified. However, long-term energy se-
curity does not require immediate commercial justification.
Leading authorities have pointed out that the demand for plu-
tonium for research and for the next generation of power reactors
has caused many States to construct reprocessing plants.7 There
are a number of important possible peaceful uses of plutonium
that are being researched. These include the development of
breeder reactors and the use of plutonium to enrich uranium.'
Breeder reactor research is particularly important to a nation like
Shangri-La which has no local source of fuel.' A successful
breeder reactor program could lead to energy self-sufficiency be-
cause breeder reactors produce more special fissionable material
than they consume.'0 That Shangri-La might successfully perfect,
for example, breeder reactor technology is more than a specula-
tive proposition; Shangri-La has outstanding nuclear scientists
both at its Nuclear Physics Institute and its Eternal Light Uni-
versity."
What all these factors indicate in sum is that at the time of
the signing of the Bilateral Agreement both parties recognized the
principle that the fear of nuclear weapons proliferation should not
be used as an excuse for preventing non-nuclear weapon States
from developing sophisticated peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
B. Pandora, through the unilateral declaration of its president,
has irrevocably approved use of the reprocessing plant.
On August 20, 1976, the President of Pandora conducted a
news conference carried by nationwide television in Pandora. The
Kingdom of Shangri-La submits that the unequivocal unilateral
statement by the President of Pandora, quoted in the stipulation
of record,' 2 irrevocably bound Pandora to the following interpre-
tation of its treaty obligations:
1. Pandora had determined that safeguards could be effec-
tively applied; and
2. Therefore, Pandora had no legal option but to determine
that the reprocessing plant is acceptable.
7. A. McNIGHT, ATOMIC SAFEGUARDS: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION 198
(1971).
8. Id. at 194-95.
9. Stipulation of Record, Correction No. 3 (Letter of Dec. 3, 1976).
10. W. EPSTEIN, THE LAST CHANCE 38 (1976).
11. Stipulation of Record at 1.
12. Id. at 2-3.
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This is the precise interpretation of Pandora's treaty obliga-
tions urged in "A" above.
International law has long recognized that a nation may bind
itself by means of unilaterial declarations.'3 Recently, in the
Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France),4 the majority opinion
of the Court stated:
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral
acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect
of creating legal obligations .... An undertaking of this kind, if
given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not
made within the context of negotiations, is binding.'5
At the press conference, the President of Pandora clearly stated
that Pandora is committed to a particular legal proposition. The
statement by the President of Pandora was publicly made. There-
fore, the only issue before this Court is the intent with which the
statement was made.
In the Nuclear Test Cases, the Court relied heavily on state-
ments by the French President and Minister of Defense at press
conferences in determining that France had bound itself to dis-
continue the testing of nuclear explosives in the South Pacific.",
The statements of the President of France in the Nuclear Test
Cases and the statement of the President of Pandora in this case
were made under similar circumstances. The legal consequences
should be the same.
Shangri-La does not argue that all public statements by
States should be legally binding. But, as Thomas Franck has
pointed out,'7 the intention of the speaker must in part be deter-
mined by the state of mind of the listener. At a nationally tele-
vised press conference of the President of one of the world's lead-
ing nuclear powers, the world is listening very carefully. Under
these circumstances, the President of a nation, the prime spokes-
man of State policy, "must be taken to intend the natural conse-
quences of his words just as actors are assumed, in law, to intend
13. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 511-12 (1966); Garner, The
International Binding Force of Unilateral Oral Declarations, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 493 (1933).
See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 22.
14. [1974] I.C.J. 253.
15. Id. at 267.
16. Id. at 265-67.
17. Franck, Word Made Law: The Decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Test Cases, 69
AM. J. INT'L L. 612 (1975).
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the natural consequences of their acts."'"
Based on the same principles of international law this Court
used to determine that France was bound by the statements of
its high officials, this Court should detemine that Pandora is
bound by the statement of its President.
C. If Pandora discontinues further nuclear cooperation because
of Shangri-La's use of the reprocessing plant, Pandora will have
violated international law by terminating the Bilateral Agree-
ment without justification.
If Pandora discontinues further nuclear cooperation, it will
have effectively terminated the Bilateral Agreement since Pan-
dora's only obligation una1er the agreement is to cooperate.'9 Such
a termination, because of Shangri-La's use of the reprocessing
plant, would clearly be arbitrary because the Bilateral Agreement
does not give Pandora the right to terminate the treaty under the
circumstances outlined in the stipulation of record.
This action would be arbitrary for two reasons. First, Pan-
dora has failed to demonstrate why the safeguard provisions in
Article XI(B) (2) cannot be effectively applied in light of the fact
that Shangri-La has agreed to the imposition of IAEA safeguards
on the facility. Second, through the unilateral declaration of its
President, Pandora has irrevocably committed itself to the propo-
sition that the safeguard provisions can be effectively applied and
that Pandora has no legal option but to approve reprocessing.
Any attempt to alter this position would violate international
law.
International law does not permit termination of treaties
without justification. Judge De Castro of this Court has stated:
"The true position is that a declaration of termination or suspen-
sion must be objectively justified to be valid."20 Dictum to the
contrary in the South West Africa Case2' has been severely criti-
cized.22 Herbert W. Briggs has pointed out that the Vienna Con-
18. Id. at 616-17.
19. Stipulation of Record, Annex A, art. II at 1.
20. Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, Judgment, [1972]
I.C.J. 46, 133n. (separate opinion of Judge De Castro) [hereinafter cited as ICAO Council,
Judgment].
21. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Reso-
lution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16 [hereinafter cited as South West Africa Case].
22. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the
[Vol. 111:2
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vention rules on treaty interpretation, which the Court in the
South West Africa Case said in many respects codify customary
international law,23 do not recognize a unilateral right to termi-
nate treaties.2 4 Briggs points out that, in cases since South West
Africa, the Court has rejected claims of "a unilateral right of
denunciation of jurisdictional treaties on grounds of breach, du-
ress, changed conditions, or the nature of the treaty. ' 2'
Pandora has failed to provide "objective justification" 2 for
its threat to discontinue further nuclear cooperation. Pandora
will therefore violate international law if it carries out its threat.
II. PANDORA HAD NO RIGHT TO TERMINATE FUEL SHIPMENTS TO
SHANGRI-LA.
A. The NPT does not prohibit Pandora from fulfilling its obliga-
tions to Shangri-La.
The NPT does not apply to obligations incurred by its adher-
ents before the entry into force of the Treaty. Article 28 of the
Vienna Convention codified the principle of customary interna-
tional law that "[u]nless a different intention appears from the
treaty or is otherwise established its provisions do not bind a
party . . . before the date of entry into force of the treaty.217
Pandora became a party to the NPT on March 5, 1970, over five
years after the contractual obligation to ship fuel to,Shangri-La
was incurred by private Pandorian corporations pursuant to the
Bilateral Agreement.
These fuel contracts were provided for in Article VII of the
Bilateral Agreement "[u]nder terms and conditions as may be
agreed. 28 Pandora had the opportunity to set down any condi-
tions it wished before allowing the fuel contracts to be signed
pursuant to the terms of the Bilateral Agreement. After the pres-
ent long-term fuel contracts expire, Pandora will again have the
opportunity, consistent with the objects and purposes of the
Agreement, to set any conditions it wishes on future fuel
International Court of Justice. 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 51 (1974).
23. South West Africa Case, supra note 21, at 47.
24. Briggs, supra note 22, at 56. See also Nahlik, The Grounds of Invalidity and
Termination of Treaties, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 736 (1971).
25. Briggs, supra note 22, at 67.
26. ICAO Council, Judgment, supra note 20, at 133n. (separate opinion of Judge De
Castro).
27. Vienna Convention, art. 28.
28. Stipulation of Record, Annex A.
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contracts. The United States, a major supplier nation, has almost
identical terms in its bilateral agreements. When the United
States decided to terminate fuel contracts under its bilateral
agreements, it adopted a "fold-in" policy in which these agree-
ments were honored but not renewed when they expired.2 1 If this
policy was considered as obligatory upon the United States, it is
probative of the contention of Shangri-La that this practice is the
only reasonable interpretation of the terms of the Bilateral Agree-
ment. It is the position of Shangri-La that whatever restrictions
Pandora is obligated to put on future fuel contracts, as a signa-
tory to the NPT, the present fuel contracts are unaffected by the
mandates of the NPT. This position is supported by leading pub-
licists.
It is an accepted rule of treaty law that termination of a
treaty, for whatever cause and in whatever way, can only affect
its continuing obligations, and cannot per se affect or prejudice
any right already definitively and finally accrued under it, or
undo or reverse anything effected by any clause of an executed
character in the treaty.3
Subsequent State practice is an accepted method of deter-
mining the intent of the parties31 and Pandora has established,
by its conduct, that the NPT was not, in Pandora's interpreta-
tion, meant to affect pre-existing contractual obligations, such as
the shipping of fuel to Shangri-La.
In interpreting a treaty, the conduct or action of the parties
thereto cannot be ignored. If all the parties to a treaty execute
it, or permit its executing in a particular manner, that fact may
reasonably be taken into account as indicative of the real inten-
tion of the parties or of the purpose which the instrument was
designed to serve.3"
Pandora allowed its domestic corporations to commence the ship-
ment of fuel to Shangri-La in 1971. Of critical importance is the
fact that this was subsequent to Pandora becoming a party to the
29. M. WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ARMS
CONTROL 59-60 (1969).
30. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice
1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points, 33 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 203, 269
(1957). See also A. McNAm, supra note 4, at 532.
31. A. McNmR, supra note 4, at 425.
32. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention of the Law of Treaties,
art. 19, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 937, 966 (Supp. 1935).
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NPT in 1970. This clearly indicates that at the time fuel ship-
ments were commenced and up until the present dispute, Pan-
dora interpreted the NPT as not precluding the fulfillment of the
contractual obligation to Shangri-La.
B. The rights of Shangri-La cannot be abrogated by a treaty
that it is not bound to honor.
Shangri-La is not a party nor has it consented to be bound
by the NPT.
Treaties impose no legal obligations on non-parties, pacta
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.33 It is a well established principle
of customary international law that when there are parties to an
earlier agreement who were not included as signatories to a later
agreement on the same subject matter, the obligations and rights
of the States are governed by the earlier agreement. 4 Therefore,
the rights and obligations of the respective States cannot be
modified unless such modification is specified in the agreements
in which both States have concurred, or the NPT has the force
of customary international law.
1. The Bilateral Agreement contained no right of revision.
There is no right of modification in the Bilateral Agreement.
Although Article II of the agreement dictates that cooperation is
subject to "the applicable laws, regulations and license require-
ments in their respective countries," this cannot be reasonably
interpreted as giving an absolute right of modification. This Ar-
ticle must be interpreted in light of the fact that the Bilateral
Agreement was not self-executing. The signing of the Agreement
did not obligate the parties to transfer any materials until the
terms and conditions for the transfer of power reactors and fuel
were agreed upon pursuant to Article VII. However, when Pan-
dora agreed to the terms and conditions for the shipment of the
power reactors and long-term fuel contracts, it made a determina-
tion that the requirements of its internal law were met and that
the Agreement could be executed.
33. T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 55 (1974).
34. R. ROXBURGH, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND THIRD STATES 19 (1917); G.
SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (6th ed. 1976); Dahl,
Application of Successive Treaties Dealing with the Sanie Subject Matter, 17 INDIAN Y.B.
INT'L AFFAIRS 279 (1974).
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Internal law cannot take precedence over an international
agreement when the intent to do so is not clearly stated.
Where the conflict is between a rule of internal law and a
rule of intenational law that has direct effects in the internal
legal system, the rule established by the treaty must prevail; the
preeminence of the treaty results from the very nature of inter-
national treaty law. 5
There is nothing in Article II to suggest that a continuous right
to terminate existing obligations existed if the internal law of
Pandora changed.
The principle of in dubio mitius dictates that if the intent of
the parties is unclear "that meaning is to be preferred which is
less onerous for the party assuming an obligation."3 Shangri-La
increased its dependence on the fuel from these reactors for its
electrical power. Such action would be inconsistent with Shangri-
La's national interests if at any time Pandora could stop fuel
shipments. Pandora never informed Shangri-La of such an inter-
pretation but let Shangri-La continue to become increasingly
dependent on Pandorian fuel.
Pandora also violated its obligation to act in good faith. A
signatory State from the time it signs an agreement is under a
good faith obligation "not to do anything.., which will diminish
the value of any property or other rights" of another signatory.37
The legislature of Pandora had sufficient knowledge that its ac-
tion was in conflict with the obligations Pandora owed to Shangri-
La by virtue of the Bilateral Agreement at the time the limiting
legislation was enacted. It is clear that no State can be bound by
any new obligations to which consent was refused, ex consensu
advenit vinculum. 38 By attempting to impose new obligations on
Shangri-La before fulfilling its existing contractual obligations,
Pandora has clearly violated customary international law.
35. Etat Belge v. S.A. "Fromagerie Franco-Suisse Le-Ski," [1971] Journal des
Tribunaux 460, 473-74, 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8141, at 7620 (CCH trans.). See Note,
Conflicts Between Treaties and Subsequently Enacted Statutes in Belgium: Etat Beige
v. S.A. "Fromagerie Franco-Suisse Le-Ski," 72 MICH. L. REv. 118, 124 (1975). See also I.
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 89 (1973).
36. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 953 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1961); see
Bowett, Estoppel Before International Tribunals and Its Relation to Acquiescence, 32
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 176 (1957).
37. A. McNAIR, supra note 4, at 204.




2. The NPT is not customary international law.
The NPT fails to meet two criteria necessary for status as
customary international law.39 The criterion of practice over a
considerable time derived from a feeling of obligation among na-
tions has not been met by the signatories of the NPT. Aside from
the fact it has only been in force a few years, nations who are
signatories have the right to withdraw upon three months' no-
tice."
The second criterion is that there must be general acquies-
cence in the practice by other States. Certainly this is not true
in the region of the world where Shangri-La is situated. Almost
all of the States of the Near East, such as the People's Republic
of China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma have rejected
the NPT as discriminatory and ineffectual.4"
Shangri-La is in favor of a reduction of both the horizontal
and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. At such time when
the other States in the Near East are also willing to commit
themselves to the principle of non-proliferation and when the
nuclear States begin to take serious steps to reduce vertical prolif-
eration, Shangri-La would be ready to recognize the NPT and
adhere to its dictates. Shangri-La shares the view of the United
States authority Morton A. Kaplan:
If the treaty is simply used as a pretext to forcibly prevent
other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons still further dam-
age to the bases of international law can be expected. In an era
of nuclear development, a stable international legal system is
needed. Some method of checking the spread of nuclear arms
must be found which will, at the same time, preserve the integ-
rity of the international system. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty appears to be misconceived for both these purposes and
actually presents a threat to the prospects for a successful sys-
tem of international law.2
39. Hudson, Working Paper on Art. 24 of the Statute of the International Law
Commission, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 24, 26; U.N. Doc. ACN.4/16 (1950).
40. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, art. X(1),
[1970] 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (effective Mar. 5, 1970).
41. 0. MARWAH & A. SCHULZ, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE NEAR-NUCLEAR
COUNTRIES 335-36 (1975) (app. C).
42. Kaplan, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Its Rationale, Prospects and Pos-
sible Impact on International Law, 18 J. PUB. L. 1 (1969).
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C. Article XII(A) of the Bilateral Agreement does not give Pan-
dora the right to terminate fuel shipments to Shangri-La.
Any right that Pandora may have had to determine the ade-
quacy of the safeguards imposed by the IAEA was eliminated by
the Trilateral Agreement. Article XII(A) of the Bilateral Agree-
ment provides that Pandora's Article XI safeguard rights will be
"suspended" with the following proviso: "during the time and to
the extent that the Government of the Republic of Pandora agrees
that the need to exercise such rights is satisfied by a safeguards
agreement to be negotiated between the Parties and the Agency."
By signing the Trilateral Agreement, Pandora agreed, in Section
6, that its bilateral safeguard rights are "suspended." The proviso
was not included in the Trilateral Agreement.
It is an accepted rule of international law that when States
enter into two separate treaties on the same subject matter, the
subsequent treaty controls as to any conflicts between the provi-
sions of the two conflicting treaties. 3 Since a conflict exists be-
tween these two treaties regarding the viability of the proviso in
the Bilateral Agreement, the later treaty, which eliminates the
proviso, should prevail.
This interpretation is supported by Section 31 of the
Trilateral Agreement which grants either party the right to termi-
nate the Trilateral Agreement only after giving the other parties
six month's notice. This is in marked contrast to the proviso in
Article XII(A) which, in effect, gave Pandora the right to termi-
nate the Trilateral Agreement at any time. It is apparent that the
six-month termination clause in the Trilateral Agreement is in-
consistent with the proviso in the Bilateral Agreement. However,
the six-month termination clause is consistent with the fact that
the proviso was omitted from the Trilateral Agreement.
A noted authority44 reports that the interpretation of the Tri-
lateral Agreement urged here is consistent with the intepretation
of the word "suspend" in most IAEA trilateral agreements. It
means that the safeguard rights of the supplying country are
suspended as long as the IAEA is capable of providing the neces-
sary safeguards. Therefore, Pandora does not have the right under
Article XII(A) of the Bilateral Agreement to terminate fuel ship-
ments to Shangri-La.
43. A. McNAi, supra note 4, at 219; I. SINCLMR, supra note 35. See Vienna Conven-
tion, art. 30(3).
44. A. McKNIGHT, supra note 7, at 119-20.
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D. Pandora has committed an international tort by stopping
fuel shipments to Shangri-La.
Pandora has committed an international tort by ordering its
private corporations to stop fuel shipments to Shangri-La. Georg
Schwarzenberger, eminent British publicist, gives an illustration
of the applicability of the doctrine.
A sovereign State is responsible for all its organs, but only
for its own organs. It is not responsible for spontaneous acts of
individuals or private organisations in a democratic State with-
out connivance by the government that does not amount to a
breach of a treaty of commerce with the country whose exports
are subjected to the boycott. If, however, the government en-
couraged or promoted such a boycott, it would commit a breach
of treaty.45
Since the breach of the contractual obligation to Shangri-La
stems directly from the official actions of the government of Pan-
dora, it would be inappropriate for the Court to ignore the tor-
tious conduct of Pandora. This was an action that was unsupport-
able by any principle of international law.
Ill. SHANGRI-LA RETAINS THE RIGHT TO DEVELOP ANY PEACEFUL USE
OF NUCLEAR POWER.
A. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions are not prohibited pursuant to
any of the agreements or treaties common to both States.
Under the terms of the Bilateral Agreement, Shangri-La
agreed that none of the materials transferred from Pandora to
Shangri-La would be used for "atomic weapons, or for any other
military purpose."" Atomic weapon is defined in the agreement
as "any device utilizing atomic energy ... the principal purpose
of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon
prototype, or a weapon test device. '47 This definition clearly does
not preclude Shangri-La from exploring the potential of PNE's.
PNE's can be used for weapon development or another military
purpose but this is not their principal purpose.
Contextual means of intepretation support this conclusion.
45. G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 34, at 145.
46. Stipulation of Record, Annex A, art. X(A)(2), at 2.
47. Id., art. I(3), at 1 (emphasis added).
1977]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
The Statute of the IAEA,48 to which both States are signatories,
had two objectives: the promotion of the peaceful use of the atom
and protection against diversion for military purposes." Pandora,
by unilaterally declaring that Shangri-La is prohibited from ex-
ploring an option it believes to offer long-range economic benefits,
is usurping the first function while not directly serving the second
function of the very agency it helped to establish.
B. Prohibitions upon non-nuclear nations from research into the
possible economic benefits of PNE's violate a fundamental pre-
cept of international law.
Shangri-La has a fundamental right to develop its natural
resources and PNE development offers real and substantial bene-
fits in this area. The Soviet Union is already reaping these eco-
nomic advantages.
The editor of the scientific journal, Nature, Dr. David
Davies, reported in an article recently that the Soviet Union has
exploded more than 70 nuclear devices since 1967 to build ca-
nals, increase the flow from oil fields, store water and put out oil
well gushes. In the New Times of Moscow in February 1975, Igor
Dmitriyev has confirmed that with a PNE the Soviet Union had
blasted a 50,000 cubic meter underground reservoir to store gas
condensate. The Soviet experts claim that this new nuclear
method cut construction costs to one-third."
The Republic of Pandora had not declared its intention to halt
research on the development of PNE's and, pursuant to the terms
of the NPT, demands that any benefits that accrue from such
research flow from the industrial nations to the Third World
States. Pandora's refusal to allow Shangri-La to further its course
of independent national development is in violation of the princi-
ples expressed in General Assembly Resolution 1803.
6. International co-operation for the economic development of
developing countries, whether in the form of public or private
48. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Abency, done Oct. 26, 1956, [1957]
8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended, Oct. 4, 1961, [19631 14
U.S.T. 135, T.I.A.S. No. 5284, 471 U.N.T.S. 334.
49. Bunn, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968 Wis. L. RFv. 766, 767.
50. K. Subrahmanyam, India's Nuclear Policy, in NucL PROLIFERATION AND THE
NEAR-NucLRAR CouNREs 125, 142 (0. Marwah & A. Schulz eds. 1975).
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capital investments, exchange of goods and services, technical
assistance, or exchange of scientific information shall be such as
to further their independent national development. .... 5
General Assembly Resolution 1803 is directed toward the devel-
opment of natural resources of Third World countries and this is
the major use of PNE's. Aside from excavation projects, there is
"great potential value in the fracturing of deep-seated shale so as
to free deposits of oil and gas. ' 52 At least one highly qualified
publicist has determined that this principle of self-determination
has the status of a jus cogens in international law.13 Such a deter-
mination by this Court would lead to only one conclusion: that
General Assembly Resolution 1803 is a preemptory norm of inter-
national law with which treaties may not conflict. 4
Judge Ammoun of this Court has expressed the view that
General Assembly resolutions, such as General Assembly Resolu-
tion 1803, have taken on the character of a subsidiary source of
international law and cites the "views to this effect of Messrs.
Lach, Mohammed Sami Abdelhamid, Falk, Pechuta, Mc-
Whinney, and Asomuah. ' '5
C. The obligations and rights of the parties to the Bilateral
Agreement are unimpaired by the diplomatic note of January
1971.
Pandora did not change the fact that the Bilateral Agree-
ment puts no restriction on Shangri-La's right to develop PNE's
by sending a diplomatic note to that effect to Shangri-La. A
unilateral interpretation of an international agreement, whether
made by the executive, legislative, or judicial organs of one of the
contracting States, is not binding upon the other contracting
States. 6 While it may be possible to acquiesce to an interpreta-
tion of a treaty, this is not the situation here. Shangri-La ex-
pressed its disapproval of the Pandorian note, albeit unofficially.
There is nothing in the wording of the Treaty to indicate an
51. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217(1963).
52. A. McKNIGHT, supra note 7, at 80.
53. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 500.
54. See A. Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, in
International Law in the Twentieth Century 217 (L. Gross ed. 1969).
55. Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase), [1970] I.C.J. 253, 302 n.31 (separate
opinion of Judge Ammoun).
56. P. JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 143 (1948); 1 JURIS-CLASSEUR DE DROrT
INTERNATIONAL fast. 12-C, para. 7 (1962).
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intention on the part of the signatories to prohibit PNE's. The
United Sates of America, which is another major nuclear supplier
nation, uses identical terms and conditions in its "Agreements for
Cooperation." 57 William H. Donnelly, a United States specialist
on nuclear affairs, reported before the United States Congress:
The agreements for cooperation are silent about the use of
U.S.-supplied materials and equipment to develop so-called
peaceful nuclear explosives.... Although all agreement nations
are commited to use transferred items solely for civil purposes
and not to use them for atomic weapons or for military purposes,
there is no prohibition on peaceful nuclear explosives. The defi-
nition of atomic weapons in the agreement does not include such
devices.58
This contextual factor indicates that Pandora's diplomatic
note was not a reasonable interpretation of the Bilateral Agree-
ment but a revision of it. Consistent with the principle of pacta
sunt servanda, "no international agreement can be validly re-
vised with effect for all parties unless approval has been given by
all."59 Shangri-La has clearly not given its approval to this revi-
sion and indeed has indicated a contrary intent, informing the
officer delivering the note that "we do not share this understand-
ing."6 0
Shangri-La wishes to re-emphasize its position. It does not
intend at the present time to experiment with the uses of PNE's.
But we reserve the right to do so in the future if such experiments
are determined by Shangri-La to be in its economic interests. A
holding by this Court rejecting our position would, in our opinion,
significantly hamper our independent national development and
force us to be dependent on the benevolence of the developed
countries for our economic progress.
D. The use of economic sanctions to coerce Shangri-La into sur-
rendering its peaceful nuclear option is an act of aggression.
Pandora is guilty of what one leading commentator has la-
beled as "indirect or ideological aggression."6 It is clear the term
57. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN ATOMIC ENERGY: AN ANALYSIS (Comm.
Print 1976).
58. Id. at 19.
59. I. DEI'rER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TIEATIEs 734 (1967).
60. Stipulation of Record at 1.
61. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRucruRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 262 (1964).
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aggression is not limited to physical attack; the infringement of
economic right can have the same result.
Also to be considered as an act of aggression shall be...
unilateral action to deprive a State of the economic resources
derived from the fair practice of international trade, or to en-
danger its basic economy, thus jeopardizing the security of that
State or rendering it incapable of acting in its own defence and
co-operating in the collective defence of peace.2
It is a matter of record that the electrical power provided by the
power reactors fueled by Pandorian-origin fuel supplies twenty
percent of the electrical power essential to the industry of
Shangri-La. 3 Armed with the knowledge of the potentially devas-
tating effects of the closing of these power plants, Pandora is
attempting to blackmail Shangri-La into compromising its rights
under the Bilateral Agreement between the two countries. In the
diplomatic note of September 20, 1976, Pandora stated it "would
no longer transfer fuel to Shangri-La unless Shangri-La . . .
agreed to the interpretation in the United Republic of Pandora's
note of January 1971."l In that earlier diplomatic note, Pandora
attempted to revise the Bilateral Agreement to preclude Shangri-
La from developing PNE's. 5 Shangri-La never consented to such
a revision and will not be coerced into doing so now. Pandora is
committing an act of aggression this Court cannot ignore.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Considering that Pandora has illegally refused to allow the
reprocessing of fuel in Shangri-La;
Considering that Pandora has illegally attempted to. restrict
the development of peaceful nuclear explosive technology;
Considering that Pandora has illegally teminated all fuel
shipments to Shangri-La;
Shangri-La respectfully requests the Court to:
1. Order Pandora to abide by its original detemination and
deem the reprocessing plant "acceptable" within the meaning of
Article VIII(F) of the Bilateral Agreement; or, in the alternative,
2. Order Pandora to make an objective, good faith determi-
62. Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Defining Aggression at para.
441, U.N. Doc. A/2211 (1952).
63. Stipulation of Record at 2.
64. Id. at 3.
65. See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
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nation of whether the safeguard provisions of Article XI(B) (2) can
be effectively applied; and
3. Order Pandora to provide for the fulfillment of the long-
term fuel contracts; and
4. Declare that Shangri-La has the right to develop all as-
pects of peaceful nuclear technology including PNE's; and
5. Provide any and all additional relief this Court deems
equitable.
MEMORIAL FOR PANDORA: ARGUMENT
I. To MINIMIZE THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, PANDORA
HAS RETAINED THE RIGHT IN THE BILATERAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT
TO FIND UNACCEPTABLE A REPROCESSING FACILITY WHERE EFFECTIVE
SAFEGUARDS ARE ABSENT.
A. The Bilateral Agreement requires that a joint determination
be reached as to the effectiveness of proposed safeguards prior to
any reprocessing of Pandorian-origin fuel.
Article VIII(F) of the Bilateral Agreement provides that
when special nuclear material transferred from the United Re-
public of Pandora to the Kingdom of Shangri-La is to be repro-
cessed, this reprocessing is to take place only in a facility
"acceptable to both parties upon a joint determination that the
provisions of Article XI may be effectively applied."' This lan-
guage is crucial to the fulfillment of the primary objectives of the
Bilateral Agreement. These objectives are clearly set forth by the
parties in Articles 11 and XI of the Bilateral Agreement.' Article
11 of the Bilateral Agreement provides, in part, that "the Parties
shall cooperate with each other in the achievement of the uses of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes."3 Article XI, which is also
specifically referred to in Article VIII(F) above, provides, in part,
that
A. The Government of the United Republic of Pandora and
the Government of the Kingdom of Shangri-La emphasize their
common interest in assuring that any material, equipment or
devices made available to the Government of the Kingdom of
1. Stipulation of Record, Annex A, at 2.
2. Id. at 1, 3.
3. Id. art. II, at 1.
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Shangri-La or any authorized persons under its jurisdiction pur-
suant to this Agreement shall be used solely for civil purposes.,
When construing treaty language, it is an accepted principle
of international law that words and phrases used are to be given
their ordinary meaning. If there is any doubt as to the meaning
of the provision, it is appropriate to look to the objectives of the
agreement and the meaning of the instrument taken as a whole. 5
The function of international tribunals in interpreting treaties
has been often stated by leading commentators on the law of
treaties to be "to give effect to the intention of the parties as
expressed in the words used by them in the light of the surround-
ing circumstances." 6 The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties7 [hereinafter referred to as Vienna Convention] pro-
poses the same approach to treaty interpretation. Article 31 con-
tains the fundamental principle that a treaty should be "inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purposes."' Additional principles to be followed
in interpreting the language of a given provision of an agreement
are set forth under Article 31. The primary approach prescribed
by the Vienna Convention is as follows: concentrating on the
actual text of the agreement; relying on the ordinary meaning of
words; taking the treaties as a whole; and striving to give effect
to the intention of the parties. Thus Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention manifestly intends the terms of a treaty to be inter-
preted in light of the treaty as a whole, as well as the other factors
mentioned in Article 31.10 Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Con-
vention" on treaty interpretation are thereby intended to be de-
4. Id. at 3.
5. 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 221-23 (1943).
6. A. McNAR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 383 (1961); I. SINCLAM, THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 71 (1973).
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. AICONF. 39/27 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. See also S. Ro-
SENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: GUIDE TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF VIENNA CONVENTION (1970).
8. Vienna Convention, art. 31(1).
9. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 33 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 203 (1957); Mer-
rills, Two Approaches to Treaty Interpretation, [1968-69] AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 55, 56
(1971).
10. Merriills, supra note 9, at 57.
11. Vienna Convention, arts. 31, 32.
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claratory of "the comparatively few general principles which ap-
pear to constitute general rules for interpretation of treaties.' 2
It is therefore proper to look to the language of Articles II and
XI of the Bilateral Agreement in order to fully understand the
ramifications of the language used in Article VIII(F). Clearly,
interpreting the language of Article II cumulatively with the lan-
guage of Article XI, the Bilateral Agreement has an unambiguous
bipartite purpose. The parties agree to cooperate with each other
in the achievement of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and
ensure that any material transferred from Pandora to Shangri-La
is to be used solely for civil purposes. The parties have agreed to
aid each other in the development of peaceful nuclear technology
provided that the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation is
controlled. Article VIII(F) must be read in light of these objec-
tives. Therefore, pursuant to the commitment outlined by Article
VIII(F), Shangri-La can only remove and store spent fuel pending
the required joint determination. Additional probative force is
given to this argument by the fact that the same interpretation
has been attributed by the United States to identical language
used in bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between the
United States and various participating nations.13
The Vienna Convention, Article 32, provides that such ex-
trinsic sources may be viewed as corroborative of the meaning
resulting from the application of Article 31.14 Therefore, the
"effective" safeguarding mechanisms required to be agreed upon
prior to reprocessing of Pandorian-origin fuel are not expressly
provided for within the confines of the existing agreement.
Rather, what Article VIII(F) does, in effect, is to provide for a
further determination as to what would constitute effective safe-
guards should any Pandorian-origin fuel be destined for repro-
cessing.
12. International Law Commission, Commentary, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 248, 350 para.
5 (1967); [1966] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 206, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966.
13. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN ATOMIC ENERGY: AN ANALYSIS (Comm.
Print 1976); Hearings on Nuclear Proliferation Before the Subcomm. on International
Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
14. Vienna Convention, art. 32.
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B. The Trilateral Agreement does not limit Pandora's preroga-
tive to determine the acceptability of Shangri-La's Reprocessing
facility.
The reference made to Article XI in Article VIII(F) cannot
be construed to imply that a simple extension of the existing
safeguarding measures (including those provided for by the Tri-
lateral Agreement) would suffice to secure the reprocessing plant.
The civil use guarantee under Article XI 5 is not superseded by
the entry into force of the Trilateral Agreement." On the con-
trary, Section 2 of the Trilateral Agreement reiterates this guar-
antee. 7
Articles XI and XII of the Bilateral Agreement provide that
"safeguards rights" shall be those safeguards enforced by the
International Atomic Energy Agency [hereinafter referred to as
IAEA] pursuant to the Trilateral Agreement "during the time
and to the extent that the Government of the Republic of Pan-
dora agrees that the need to exercise such rights is satisfied by a
safeguards agreement to be negotiated between the Parties and
the Agency."'" The need extends to the non-proliferation guaran-
tees given as part of the safeguarding system in Article XI as well
as the safeguards themselves. The term "safeguards" as used by
the parties is defined in Article I of the Bilateral Agreement to
mean: "a system of controls designed to assure that any materi-
als, equipment and devices committed to the peaceful use of
atomic energy are not used to further any military purpose. '" 9
These provisions (Articles 1(9), VIII(F), XI(A), and XII) when
viewed together, indicate that Shangri-La's manifestation of its
willingness to permit "IAEA safeguards in the reprocessing
plant"2 does not, by itself, constitute compliance with the re-
quirements of Article VIII(F). Rather, a system of controls must
be designed to effectively ensure that nuclear materials supplied
by Pandora, which are committed to peaceful uses,21 are not used
to further any military purpose. Any other interpretation of these
provisions would result in the frustration of the declared objective
15. See text accompanying notes 1-14 supra.
16. Stipulation of Record, Annex B.
17. Id. at 1.
18. Stipulation of Record, Annex A, art. XII, at 4 (emphasis added).
19. Id. art. 1(9), at 1. See also Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Oct. 26, 1956, art. III(A)(5), [1957] 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, as
amended, Oct. 4, 1961, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 135, T.I.A.S. No. 5284, 471 U.N.T.S. 334.
20. Stipulation of Record at 2.
21. Id., Annex A, art. X(A)(2), at 2.
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of both the Bilateral and Trilateral Agreements. "When a treaty
is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other
does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith
and the object and purpose of the treaty demand that the former
interpretation should be adopted."2 An examination of the prolif-
eration dangers surrounding the operation of a reprocessing plant
is appropriate to determine what type of safeguards could be
effectively applied, thereby providing an objective standard as to
the acceptability of a given reprocessing facility.
The requirement for safeguards is designed to impose con-
stant regulation on the international community whereby nuclear
energy is to be utilized in a manner consistent with international
nuclear security. The objectives of safeguards is repeatedly de-
clared to be insurance against the use of any nuclear materials
to further any military purpose. "3 Circumstances may arise in
which a particular State is tempted to disregard its peaceful use
assurances. The rationale behind the existing IAEA safeguards
system (primarily a system of record-keeping and follow-up
inspections) is that any violation of peaceful use guarantees will
be detected and called to the attention of the international com-
munity well before the-violator can attain nuclear weapons capa-
bility."4 The delinquent State is thereby exposed to international
pressure which would frustrate his illicit purposes.25
Where the nuclear fuel cycle in a given State is limited only
to reactors and the low-enriched uranium which fuel them, mate-
rial accounting and inspection safeguards can provide the neces-
sary margin of security against possible proliferation dangers.
The spent fuel produced by the reactors is still many time-
consuming steps from a useable nuclear explosive. This is not the
case where the State has a reprocessing plant, in which pluton-
ium separation occurs. A nuclear reactor produces plutonium
from which bombs can be made, but a bomb cannot be made
until the plutonium has been separated and recovered in a repro-
22. [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 50, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966.
23. P. Szasz, International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL
SAFEGUARDS AND NucLEAR INDUSTRY 86 (M. Willrich ed. 1973); Firmage, The Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 711, 725 (1969); See also Bunn,
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 766.
24. See generally INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NucLEAR INDUSTRY (M. Willrich ed.
1973).
25. Szasz, supra note 23, at 88; Hearings, supra note 13, at 7 (statement of Dr. Victor
Gilinsky, Comm'r, U.S. Regulatory Comm'n).
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cessing plant.2 1 It is in these plants that plutonium is available
in pure form and is most susceptible to diversion for explosive
military uses.Y Therefore, there is inadequate time available for
the international community to take effective action in the event
fuel is diverted for illicit purposes. Moreover, the value of ac-
counting and inspection safeguards at this stage in detecting
transfers of fuel from peaceful to military purposes is at best
improbable. 2 Application of IAEA accounting and inspection
safeguards to Shangri-La's reprocessing plant alone would be
wholly ineffective; additionally, it would not comply with provi-
sions permitting reprocessing under Article VIII(F). Further,
there is no legitimate commercial justification for unleashing
such a threat against international security. There would be no
significant conservation factor in such a reprocessing facility. Dr.
Gilinsky, Commissioner of the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, places the conservation factor at a savings ranging
between ten and thirty percent of the uranium used if it were not
recycled,29 indicating that such a savings is at best minimal.
The former Secretary of State of the United States, Dr. Kis-
singer, in addressing the United Nations General Assembly on
the dangers of nuclear proliferation on September 22, 1975 stated:
The greatest single danger of unrestrained nuclear proliferation
resides in the spread under national control of reprocessing facil-
ities for the Atomic Materials in nuclear power plants."
Pandora has both the right and duty under the provisions of the
Bilateral Cooperation Agreement to veto the reprocessing of
Pandorian-origin fuel until such time as safeguards can be effec-
tively applied.
C. Reprocessing of Pandorian-origin fuel by Shangri-La would
constitute a material breach of the Cooperation Agreement and
would mandate a termination of any further nuclear cooperation.
Since Pandora has rightfully determined that the reprocess-
ing plant is unacceptable because of the lack of effective safe-
26. M. WILLRIcH, GLOBAL POLITICS OF NucLEAR ENERGY 37 (1971).
27. V. Gilinsky, Diversion by National Governments, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
AND NucLEAR INDUSTRY 159 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
28. See generally Hearings, supra note 13 (statement of Dr. Gilinsky).
29. Hearings, supra note 13, at 19.
30. Reproduced in 1975 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 856
(1975) (Dep't of State Publication No. 8865).
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guards, any reprocessing or any attempt to reprocess Pandorian-
origin fuel by Shangri-La constitutes a breach of Shangri-La's
obligation under Article VIIJ(F). The enforcement of this Article
is crucial to the fulfillment of the purpose of the Cooperation
Agreement viewed in its entirety. The proliferation dangers nec-
essarily resulting from the illegitimate'reprocessing of Pandorian-
origin fuel would constitute a clear breach of the civil purpose
guarantee in Article XI(A). Therefore, under the terms of Article
XI(5), Pandora has the right to "suspend or teminate this Agree-
ment and to require the return of any materials, equipment and
devices." 3,
The express provisions of the Agreement per se secure to
Pandora the right to unilaterally terminate said agreement upon
breach of the essential assurances previously given by Shangri-
La. Pandora may therefore cease all nuclear cooperation with
Shangri-La should it attempt to reprocess any Pandorian-origin
fuel.
II. THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
GOVERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES FOSTER A CONSISTENT
READING OF THE NPT AND THE BILATERAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT.
A. Internationally recognized principles of treaty interpretation
requirement that treaties be viewed as a whole to determine their
meaning.
An examination of Pandora's rights and obligations under
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons32
[hereinafter referred to as NPT] and those expressed in the
Cooperation Agreement demonstrate clearly that an interpreta-
tion of these two treaties, side by side, can give rise to no justifia-
ble conflict in their simultaneous application if each treaty is
viewed in its entirety.
An overall examination of the corpus of each treaty is the
internationally recognized approach to treaty interpretation as
espoused by the International Law Commission of the United
Nations and endorsed by the Vienna Conference on the Law of
Treaties.3 3 Professor Charles Cheney Hyde reaches the same
31. Stipulation of Record, Annex A, art. XI(5), at 4.
32. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, [1970]
21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter cited as NPTI.
33. Merrills, supra note 9, at 57.
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result, stating that "it is usually held that if the general purposes
of a treaty conflict with the literal signification of any of its terms
the former should prevail."34 Looking then, to the body of each
agreement the only conclusion to be reached is that the general
purposes of the two agreements are in complete accord.
It is postulated as a general principle of international law
that not only may successive treaties be interpreted consistently,
so as to circumvent any need to apply antiquated and often invia-
ble measures of retribution, but that it is preferable to do so, i.e.,
there exists a presumption against conflict and an inclination
toward interpretations creating cumulative legal effects.3 5 Article
26 of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, by negative impli-
cation, reaches the same result.36 Given this framework, it is es-
sential then to enumerate the pertinent obligations of Pandora
under the NPT to determine generally the objectives of this
treaty in an effort to mesh those objectives cumulatively with
those of the Bilateral and Trilateral Agreements.
The NPT divides its obligations between two categories of
States: those classified as nuclear weapon States and those as
non-nuclear weapon States. Under the NPT, "a nuclear weapon
state is one which has exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device prior to January 1, 1967."'13 As a signatory and
nuclear weapon State, Pandora is prohibited from transferring
"to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. 38 Pandora is also similarly prohibited from
aiding or encouraging any non-nuclear weapon State from manu-
facturing or otherwise acquiring such devices. 9 Coupled with
these prohibitions, the NPT obligates nuclear weapon States to
facilitate the development of nuclear energy throughout the world
and to make available to non-nuclear weapon States "the poten-
tial benefits from any peaceful applicaions of nuclear explo-
sives."40 Additionally, under Article VI, the NPT requires nuclear
34. C. Hyde, Concerning the Interpretation of Treaties, in INTERNATiONAL LAW IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 211 (L. Gross ed. 1969).
35. Dahl, The Application of Successive Treaties Dealing with the Same Subject
Matter, 17 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L AFF. 279, 304 (1974).
36. 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 3, U.N. Doc. No. A/6309/REv. 1 (1966); Inter-
national Law Commission, Commentary, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 248, 346 para. 9 (1967).
37. NPT, art. IX, para. 3.
38. Id. art. 1.
39. Id.
40. Id. art. V.
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weapon States to negotiate in good faith toward the common goal
of complete nuclear disarmament.
The Treaty is designed to accomplish these objectives by
requiring non-nuclear weapons States to accept international
safeguards and controls on their peaceful nuclear programs., The
safeguards are to be administered by the IAEA12
With these general obligations and objectives it is obvious
that the NPT is primarily concerned with reducing the threat of
nuclear war, while simultaneously providing for the advancement
of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." An in-depth reading of
the Bilateral Agreement evinces the same essence of purpose by
consistently using phrases replete with language such as, inter
alia: "the peaceful use of atomic energy";44 "for peaceful pur-
poses";45 "[n]o material . . . will be used for atomic weapons
• * . or for any other military purpose";" and "any material...
shall be used solely for civil purposes."4 Read in its entirety, this
Bilateral Agreement reduces to precisely the same propositions of
curtailment of nuclear weaponry and the advancement of peace-
ful nuclear uses as does the NPT, i.e., the two treaties stand for
identical objectives.
In light of Professor Hyde's position" and the international
preference against conflict49 it is clear that any inconsistencies
arising from a literal interpretation of specific terms must give
way to the stated congruency of purposes expressed by the two
treaties. Pandora asserts that its request in the diplomatic note
of September 20, 1976 for IAEA safeguards on all Shangri-La's
nuclear activities is in complete compliance with Pandora's obli-
gations under the NPT and is justified by this consistent reading
of the Bilateral Cooperation Agreement.
41. Id. art. III.
42. Id.
43. See generally Ehrlich, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Peaceful Uses of Nu-
clear Explosives, 56 VA. L. Ray. 587 (1970).
44. Stipulation of Record, Annex A, art. 1, at 1.
45. Id. art. XI, at 1.
45. Id. art X, at 2.
47. Id. art. XI, at 3.
48. C. Hyde, supra note 34, at 211.
49. Dahl, supra note 35, at 311.
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B. Any distinction between PNE's and nuclear weapons is
purely literal and lacks any validity given the identical technolog-
ical processes needed for their respective development.
Pandora further submits that it can and will proceed to dem-
onstrate that any literal inconsistency between the terms of the
NPT and the Bilateral Agreement is devoid of ordinary meaning,
and is at best, only a literal distortion designed with the intention
to frustrate the express purposes of the Agreement. Referring spe-
cifically to the NPT language prohibiting "nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices,"5 it becomes apparent that any
claim of discrepancies will focus on the Bilateral Agreement's
literal silence on the use of development of peaceful nuclear ex-
plosions [hereinafter referred to as PNE's]. Pandora is ready to
admit this literal deficiency, but asserts that it has no meaning
whatsoever; for the NPT specifically makes no distinction be-
tween nuclear weapons and PNE's. It is unquestioned and ac-
cepted by the majority of nations, that, from a technological
standpoint, no meaningful difference exists between a bomb and
a plowshare device.-' The distinction was dismissed rather point-
edly in a recent New York Times article which declared that a
PNE is "a device distinguishable from a nuclear weapon only by
those who think that Molotov cocktails are made with vodka. '52
Pandora respectfully restates its position that PNE's do not exist
as entities distinct from weapons, and that any distinction be-
tween PNE's and weapons is artificial. The true identity of an
explosive device unfolds only upon explosion, which, needless to
say, is too late. Hence, the Bilateral Agreement need not literally
mention PNE's so as to proscribe their use or development.
Pandora further asserts that, even literally, the Bilateral
Agreement does present a bar to the use or development of
PNE's. An inspection of the specific language of the Bilateral
Agreement reveals that: Article XI(B) (2) (c) (ii) requires that "any
... material.., be subject to all the safeguards provided for in
this Article and the guarantees set forth in Article X";53 Article
X(A)(2) bars the use of such material for the "development of
50. NPT, arts. I, II, IHI.
51. M. WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ARMS
CONTROL 69-70 (1969); Firmage, supra note 23, at 722.
52. Ross, How "Atoms for Peace" Became Bombs for Sale, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1976,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 39, col. 2.
53. Sipulation of Record, Annex A, at 3.
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atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose";54 and Article
1(9) reiterates this restriction in defining safeguards as a system
to assure that any materials "are not used to further any military
purpose."5 5 The Vienna Convention, as a reflection of customary
international law on treaty interpretation, instructs the inter-
preter to first examine Article 31 to determine the ordinary mean-
ing of terms and then Article 32 for a contextual approach to
verify a meaning derived under Article 31 or to dispel any ambi-
guity or obscurity that would create an absurd or unreasonable
result.-"
Pandora submits that the Bilateral Agreement's repeated
mention of the prohibition on any nuclear material being used or
developed as a "weapon" or for "any military purpose" is specific
enough to include a restriction on the use or development of
PNE's. By the "ordinary meaning of terms" doctrine of Article
31, Pandora finds no difficulty whatsoever in attributing a
"military purpose" to a nuclear explosive device in the possession
of an otherwise non-nuclear State. Pandora recognizes that
should this analysis still present some ambiguity, Article 32, as
the second stage of interpretation, permits going outside the text
of a treaty to resolve any conflicts. 7
It is Pandora's purpose now to seek such resolution by draw-
ing an analogy to the implications of India's 1974 explosion of its
PNE. Assuming arguendo that PNE's are a distinct entity, is it
plausible to assume that no military purpose was achieved by
such action, even if complete good faith is assumed on the part
of the actor? Is it plausible to assume that such an action would
not be viewed by the actor's immediate neighbors and in fact the
whole world as a demonstration of nuclear capability? Can India
deny in retrospect that its fear of Chinese nuclear blackmail
prompted its action?58 Can India be heard to deny that its action
placed the same pressure on Pakistan to explore a nuclear
option?59
54. Id. art. X(A)(2), at 2.
55. Id. art. 1(9), at 1.
56. See text accompanying notes 1-14 supra; see also Merrills, supra note 9, at 61.
57. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention confirms a meaning derived under Article
31 or dispels any ambiguity or obscurity that would create an absurd or unreasonable
result. See Merrills, supra note 9, at 56-61.
58. See Kapur, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy: A Perspective, 27
WORLD TODAY 379, 380-81 (1971).
59. See Comment, Legal Implications of Indian Nuclear Development, 4 DEN. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 237, 253 (1974).
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Pandora submits that the only reasonable conclusion to these
questions is an answer in the negative and that the scenario
drawn above is completely analogous to the situation in which
Shangri-La finds itself immersed. Pandora proposes that
Shangri-La cannot deny its physical and economic posture con-
cerning the pressures being placed upon it by its two overpower-
ing neighbors. These pressures are substantiated by the facts
wherein Shangri-La's parliament urged the development of nu-
clear explosives, and its defense minister declined to quash these
sentiments and instead left open the nuclear option."
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention suggests that ambigui-
ties be resolved so as to foster a reasonable result. Pandora con-
tends that within this context no other reasonable meaning can
be ascribed to the terms of the Bilateral Agreement but that the
possession of or capacity to develop PNE's does in fact further a
"military purpose."
Pandora respectfully submits that coupled with the foregoing
argument of contextual interpretation under Article 32, there
exists authority for the additional argument that Pandora's diplo-
matic note of January 1, 1971, excluding the use of PNE's under
Article X(A)(2) of the Bilateral Agreement, is significant evi-
dence of an acceptable interpretation of the Treaty. 1 Further-
more, Shangri-La's failure to formally refute this determination
resulted in Shangri-La's acquiescence in this interpretation."
Before leaving this issue of PNE's it is important that the
Court recognize that Pandora is not suggesting that a violation
of the Bilateral Agreement will only occur upon Shangri-La's
acquisition of a nuclear explosive device, but that the nuclear
capability itself is sufficient to create this same effect. The
maxim that the threat is often more powerful than its execution
is quite applicable to this situation. 3
The threat inherent in the mere capability has been capsul-
ized by Willrich, thusly:
The important security issues arising out of the nuclear genera-
tion of electric power are derived both from the very large
amount of plutonium that will be produced . . . and from the
60. Stipulation of Record at 2.
61. C. Hyde, supra note 34, at 208.
62. Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [19621
I.C.J. 6.
63. Kapur, supra note 58, at 381.
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relatively small amount required for explosives .... Less than
ten kilograms could destroy a medium-sized city. A small frac-
tion of the plutonium output diverted from a modest nuclear
power program could create grave new threats to international
security and domestic tranquility .... 11
J. Martin, Jr., the United States Ambassador to the Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament, echoed the same fear stating
that:
The critical question is not whether we can accept the stated
intentions of any country, but whether a world in which many
states have the capability to carry out nuclear explosions-and
in which all therefore fear the nuclear weapons capability of
others-would not be vastly less secure than a world that has
successfully contained the spread of nuclear explosive technol-
ogy.65
Pandora submits, based on the foregoing discussions, that its
request in the September 20, 1976 diplomatic note for IAEA
safeguards on Shangri-La's entire nuclear activity represents the
only viable solution to the proliferation dangers inherent in the
nuclear capability Shangri-La now possesses. Pandora concludes
that in view of its consistent obligations under the Bilateral
Agreement and the NPT it is left with no other choice but to cease
its fuel shipments or have Shangri-La submit to its request.
Finally, Pandora proposes that in the alternative, should the
foregoing arguments not find favor with the Court, there exists
authority for the proposition that Shangri-La be bound by Pan-
dora's requests since the NPT reflects customary international
law, thereby binding non-party States.
Treaties, particularly multilateral treaties, are often cited by
noted writers and judges as evidence of customary international
law.86
State practice both prior to and following the NPT's enact-
ment indicates that there is an emerging norm of international
law against the development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear
States. This practice has generally been evidenced first, by the
unilateral renunciations of the right to manufacture nuclear
64. M. Willrich, Worldwide Nuclear Industry, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 69 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
65. 72 DEP'T STATE BULL. 458 (1975).
66. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1966).
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weapons voiced by West Germany67 and India;6" second, by cer-
tain multilateral treaties designating particular nuclear free
zones; 9 and third, by the specific limitation on nuclear weapons
testing formalized by the entrance into force of the Limited Test
Ban Treaty. 0
Hence, the NPT is both declaratory of existing customary
international law and legislative in that it adds to the law of
nuclear non-proliferation. The Treaty's widespread acceptance"
must be considered as persuasive evidence that the NPT is pre-
sumptively representative of customary international law be-
cause it is for the most part a continuation and extension of
previous efforts to control nuclear proliferation.72
III. THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF PANDORA DURING
THE NEWS CONFERENCE DOES NOT OBLIGATE PANDORA TO APPROVE
SHANGRI-LA'S REQUEST TO REPROCESS PANDORIAN-ORIGIN FUEL UNDER
IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE REPROCESSING PLANT.
A. The Unilateral Declaration should not be given conclusive
effect so as to bind Pandora under international law.
The statement made by the President of the United Republic
of Pandora at the news conference did not constitute a legal com-
mitment to approve reprocessing of Pandorian-origin fuel. A uni-
lateral declaration regarding foreign policy of a State, alone, is
insufficient to constitute an irrevocable commitment enforceable
against the declarant under international law. In the Nuclear
Tests Cases,73 the International Court of Justice held that the
repeated public declarations of French government officials that
France would terminate atmospheric nuclear explosions, taken as
a whole, constituted a binding international commitment to
67. Willrich, West Germany's Pledge Not to Manufacture Nuclear Weapons, 7 VA.
J. INT'L L. 91 (1966).
68. Kapur, supra note 58.
69. See, e.g., Antarctic Treaty, art. V, para. 1, done Dec. 1, 1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T.
794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. See also Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons on the Seabed, done Feb. 11, 1971, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
70. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests, done Aug. 5, 1963, [1963] 14 U.S.T.
1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
71. The treaty entered into force with ninety-seven signatures and forty-seven ratifi-
cations. Smith, NATO Nuclear Information Sharing Arrangements on the NPT: Collec-
tive Defense Confronts Arms Control, 13 AToM. ENERGY L.J. 311, 341 (1972).
72. Baxter, supra note 66.
73. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1974] I.C.J. 253; Nuclear Tests Case
(New Zealand v. France), [1974] I.C.J. 457.
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cease atmospheric nuclear testing. Although the Court relied
upon the unilateral declarations made by the French government
officials as creating legal obligations, the Court's decision failed
to advocate a general principle of international law. Rather, the
Court narrowly limited the rights of States "listening-in" on such
declarations to invoke international obligations upon the declar-
ing State.
When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that
it should be bound according to its terms, that intention confers
on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking."
The Court further noted that in any such case
[t]he intention is to be ascertained by the interpretation of the
act. When States make statements by which their freedom of
action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.7
The Court has thus indicated that the intent of the declarant
State to irrevocably bind itself must be clearly determinable from
the act itself. Pandora has not made such an unqualified commit-
ment by virtue of the President's statement. Such statements
cannot be held to talismanically invoke binding obligations. It is
therefore essential that the President's statement be considered
in light of other factors at the time. The President first stated that
Shangri-La committed itself to apply safeguards to the reprocess-
ing plant, and that Pandora had concluded that it would be possi-
ble to apply an effective safeguard system. Logic and good faith
require that these remarks be read as prerequisites to the proposi-
tion sought to be enforced. The statement declared that only after
an effective safeguard system was implemented would Pandora
recognize a responsibility to approve reprocessing. 7 This state-
ment does not contain the unqualified promise of Pandora to
approve reprocessing of Pandorian-origin fuel in Shangri-La. The
statement, when regarded as a whole, only indicates that the
government of Pandora has determined to permit reprocessing if
and when adequate safeguards are effectively applied.
By finding the French declarations to be binding, the Inter-
national Court of Justice also held that France has made an inter-
national commitment to cease atmospheric nuclear testing. In so
opining, the development of an international norm of non-
74. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1974] I.C.J. at 267.
75. Id.
76. Stipulation of Record at 2.
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proliferation of nuclear explosives was further defined.77 There-
fore, in light of the Court's prevailing position, it would be incon-
gruous to argue that the Court should now find resultant from the
casual, equivocal remarks of the President of Pandora, a commit-
ment to aid Shangri-La in the reprocessing of nuclear fuel with
less than the strictest safeguards. This would be directly contrary
not only to the prior position of this Court, but also to the com-
mitments of the international community to nuclear non-
proliferation.
IV. PANDORA HAS NO ABSOLUTE OBLIGATION TO SUPPLY FUEL TO
SHANGRI-LA.
Neither the Bilateral nor the Trilateral Treaty provides for
the shipment of fuel from Pandora to Shangri-La. Such fuel ship-
ments were made pursuant to contractual arrangements between
Shangri-La and private Pandorian corporations. Under Article II
of the Bilateral Agreement, nuclear cooperation between the two
States is subject to the internal laws of both countries. While the
Treaty itself is immune from changes in the municipal laws of
Pandora, the contractual obligations are not.
While treaties are transactions between subjects of international
law, public contracts are consensual engagements between sub-
jects of international law. Thus, the presumption is in favour of
such contracts being governed by municipal law. 8
Therefore the fuel shipments themselves are dependent on the
internal laws of Pandora.
A. The Court does not have jurisdiction to order Pandora to ship
fuel to Shangri-La.
Pandora has an inherent right, under a sovereign State's po-
lice power, to restrict the activities of subjects acting within its
territory. It is doubtful whether an express provision in the treaty
is even necessary for Pandora to have the power to prohibit a
Pandorian corporation from shipping fuel to Shangri-La.
[I]n international law the express exemption from the effects
of future legislation is redundant. Such exemption cannot and
77. Comment, 4 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. supra note 59, at 239; M. WILLRICH, supra
note 51.
78. G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (6th ed.
1976).
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ought not to preclude the genuine exercise of a state's police
power.79
It is the position of Pandora that while this Court has the power
to review any treaty obligations of Pandora it does not have juris-
diction to review contractual agreements to which the
government of Pandora was not a party. Since Pandora is not a
party to the fuel shipment agreements with Shangri-La, the
Court does not have jurisdiction to order Pandora to ship fuel to
Shangri-La.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons set forth in this memorial, Respon-
dent respectfully requests that the International Court of Justice
render its decision in favor of the United Republic of Pandora
finding that:
1. Pandora has rightfully determined the reprocessing facil-
ity to be unacceptable.
2. Any reprocessing of Pandorian-origin fuel by Shangri-La
would constitute a material breach of the Bilateral Agreement by
Shangri-La, and would justify Pandora's termination of all future
nuclear cooperation.
3. Under the existing agreements, Shangri-La is prohibited
from developing or manufacturing any nuclear explosive devices.
4. Pandora may rightfully require that Shangri-La place its







79. J. Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (L. Gross ed. 1969)
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